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Introduction 
In her 2014 article, “Rethinking Care Ethics,” Olena Hankivsky claims that “care ethics is not an 
inherently intersectional perspective” (252). My paper seeks to clarify the following questions: (a) 
is an ethic of care inherently sensitive to diversity, and, furthermore, to intersectional factors? (b) 
Does an expressly intersectional version of care ethics make a necessary contribution that is 
otherwise missing, or, does it merely draw out what is already implicit in an ethic of care? I present 
the ethics of care as a critical and political ethic, in which the kinds of dispositions uncovered by 
care ethicists, as taking place within practices of care, are predisposed to being sensitive to 
diversity and intersectional forms of oppression. 
 Hankivsky’s (2014) critique claims that the ethics of care: (a) is conceptually exclusive, in 
the sense of presenting identity categories as separate/distinct dimensions, which then “intersect” 
in merely additive or multiplicative ways; (b) prioritizes the category of gender; and (c) is deficient 
in its conceptualization of power and power structures.  
 In order to explicate the deficiencies in Hankivsky’s (2014) use of intersectionality, I turn 
to S. Laurel Weldon’s (2005) description of intersectional analysis (the “intersectionality-plus” 
model), the crucial element of which is the limiting of intersectionality to an analysis of social 
structures, as opposed to personal identity. I argue that the intersectionality-plus model developed 
by Weldon (2005) is already implicit in political and/or critical theories of care.  Ultimately, it is 
the conflation of social location and personal identity – where identifying social location 
presupposes analytically distinct categories that intersect, while identity does not – is the core 
deficiency which colors Hankivsky’s entire critique, and subsequent prescriptions. 
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I. The Ethics of Care and the Intersectional Critique 
Especially important for the purposes of this paper are the kinds of “dispositions” or attitudes 
towards others that are valued from the perspective of an ethic of care, and which, I argue, make 
it inherently amenable to intersectional analysis. Joan Tronto theorizes “four phases of caring,” the 
first of which is “caring about,” and “involve[s] assuming the position of another person or group 
to recognize the need” (1993, 106). In this sense, care is focused on particular and contextually-
specific needs, rather than assuming a universalistic conception of persons, groups, and their needs 
(Tronto 1993, 109). Related to the first phase of care – “caring about” – is the first “ethical 
element” of care – “attentiveness” (Tronto 1993, 127). Attentiveness is a sensitivity to the full 
context of the other’s needs, and “requires a deep and thoughtful knowledge … of all of the actors’ 
situations, needs and competencies” (Tronto 1993, 136-37).  
 Hankivsky’s critique argues that even when care ethics attempts to see “individuals and 
groups in holistic and context-specific ways” (Hankivsky 2014, 253) it nevertheless tends to 
prioritize the category of gender, and when it does incorporate other axes of difference, it takes 
these axes as separate categories that can then be “added-on” to, or that accentuate, predominately 
gender-based oppression (Hankivsky 2014, 255-58). Hankivsky argues that intersectionality, in 
contradistinction, “focuses on the meaning and consequences of interactive and interlocking social 
locations, power structures, and processes …. [S]ocial identities are not mutually exclusive and do 
not operate in isolation of each other” (Hankvisky 2014, 253, 255). From Hankivsky’s perspective, 
failing to take into account the insights of intersectional analysis lead to a second main deficiency 
in care ethics, which is an inadequate conceptualization of power and social oppression (2014, 
258-60).  
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II. Intersectionality as a Theory of Socio-Structural Oppression 
In “The Structure of Intersectionality,” S. Laurel Weldon (2005) asserts that while some instances 
of oppression reveal intersectional effects, others reveal separable effects. Such a claim depends 
on Weldon’s approach to oppression, and by extension intersectionality, as primarily a socio-
structural issue. Weldon is therefore able to concentrate on interactions between distinct “axes of 
disadvantage” in the “organization of political life,” without running into the methodological 
problems that such an approach would entail if used to theorize personal identity. The focus is 
therefore placed on social structures as those norms, laws, practices, institutions, and everyday 
social interactions which combine to shape the lives of individual subjects (Young 1990, 2005, 
2006; Weldon 2005). It can be said that individual identities are always intersectional, but the 
content of their interactions with (and through) social structures is not – some structures become 
more prevalent than others depending on the context (Weldon 2005, 245).  
 An “intersectionality-only” model of social structural interaction (see Lugones 1994; 
Hankivsky 2014), is founded on the principle that each structure on its own has no autonomous 
effects. Furthermore, each person occupies just one social position which is determined by the 
particular blend of identity categories that that individual embodies (Weldon 2005, 241). The only 
effects are intersectional effects. I would argue, along with Weldon, that this type of analysis 
obscures the workings of social institutions to such a degree that it ultimately eliminates our ability 
to recognize potential instances of systemic oppression centered around independent features of 
social identity. Consequently, our understanding of power is not enhanced, as Hankivsky (2014) 
claims, but is rather confused, aimless, and ineffectual. The ‘intersectionality-plus’ model, on the 
other hand, is a critical and political theoretical project in the sense that it aims to uncover and 
	 4	
interrogate the structural and institutional conditions which lead to the advantage of some and the 
disadvantage of others. 
 
III. Care, Relationality, and a Politics of Attentiveness 
The problem with Hankivsky’s conceptualization of intersectionality is indicative of more general 
problems with other such “intersectionality-only” models. Hankivsky’s account of 
intersectionality conflates social structures/location with personal identity; as she describes it: 
“[I]ntersectionality can transform the descriptive and prescriptive accounts put forward by care 
theorists relating to the identities of individuals and groups and the processes of power that shape 
and reify structural inequities” (2014, 253).  
 This statement also overlooks the fact that, especially as is the case with Robinson’s critical 
ethics of care, (1999, 2010, 2011) one of the primary goals is a critique of diverse social structures: 
I see the ethics of care as a “new political formation” in this vein—
not a revolutionary feminism, or one that is certain of its 
epistemological foundations or the precise future to which it will 
give rise. It does not advocate any particular models for organizing 
care in societies, but reveals the inadequacies, gender inequities, 
racializations, and economic and geopolitical implications of vastly 
different existing arrangements regarding care within and across 
societies. (Robinson 2015, 306-307) 
 
Inherent in such a critique of “existing arrangements” at the local and global levels is an 
interrogation of how various axes of difference at the level of social structures, effect the 
distribution of burdens vis-à-vis caring responsibility, as well as accessibility and ability to care.  
Such a critique of social structures implies that depending on the context, certain structures 
are more prevalent than others. So, while Hankivsky critiques the prioritization of gender in some 
of the care literature (2014, 256, 259), one must point out that such prioritization is not arbitrary, 
but rather is a recognition that the arrangement and organization of care (historically) has been 
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(and remains) significantly structured according to gender differences (see Hartsock 1983; Schutte 
2002; Razavi and Staab 2010). 
 This is not to disagree with the spirit of Hankivsky’s critique, that much more than gender 
goes into the allocation of caring work, since care work has also been shown to be highly 
“racialized” (Robinson 2010; Duffy 2011); it is merely to take issue with her insistence that we 
cannot see analytically distinct axes of difference as having different levels of 
significance/influence depending on the context. The ability to analytically separate and 
distinguish the most significant social structures is crucial in order to critique forces of power, 
forms of oppression, and socially unjust practices. Such analytical distinctions do not obfuscate 
context, but rather do it justice.  
 For Selma Sevenhuijsen (1998), the kinds of dispositions that are seen as having value 
(from the perspective of an ethics of care), are inherently amenable to becoming political virtues 
of active citizenship. It is such political virtues which not only encourage, but implicitly require 
attention to what can be called “intersectional” forms of oppression. The values of attentiveness, 
responsiveness, and responsibility – seen from the perspective of political citizenship – would 
better enable:  
 Democratic judgments … to be capable of dealing with the radical 
alterity of human subjects, through recognizing their individuality 
and diversity while at the same time conceiving them as equals. It 
also has to take into account group affiliations and specific life 
contexts, while at the same time treating all citizens fairly, without 
stereotyping them as ‘different’ or ‘deviant’. Because people can 
meet each other in the public sphere as different but equal, they can 
adopt a public identity, and at the same time question its desirability. 
(Sevenhuijsen 1998, 15) 
 
I would argue that such a view of the ethics of care, as a form of citizenship, encapsulates how an 
ethic of care can recognize the reality of individuals as complex, multi-faceted beings as well as 
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located beings within social structures, which then produce a certain “public identity” that must 
be interrogated to see how it hinders or helps the accessibility to/provision of care within the 
particular contexts of relationships, at both macro and micro levels.  
  
Concluding remarks 
Attentiveness, as a political virtue, is crucial to a critique of social structures, and it is inherent in 
the ethics of care – as a critical-lens, premised on a relational social ontology – to be attentive to 
intersectional forms of oppression, as well as personal identity. That being said, it is not 
appropriate to demand that care ethics do both simultaneously, or critique social structures based 
on a theory of personal identity. This is not to say that social structures and personal identity are 
not connected; however, moving forward, I argue that it is more fruitful to analyze them as 
distinguishable spheres in order to illuminate and critique the systems of power and social 
structures within a multicultural and democratic society such as Canada, as located within the 
broader global context. 
